	Page 1
1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	Case No. 08-13555 (JMP)
4	x
5	In the Matter of:
6	
7	LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS, INC., ET AL,
8	
9	Debtors.
10	
11	x
12	
13	U.S. Bankruptcy Court
14	One Bowling Green
15	New York, New York 1004-1408
16	
17	July 30, 2013
18	11:01 AM
19	
20	BEFORE:
21	HON JAMES M. PECK
22	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
23	
24	
25	

Page 2 Hearing re: Motion of Dr. H.C. Tschira Beteilingungs GmbH & 1 2 Co. KG and Klaus Tschira Stiftung GGmbH to Withdraw Claim 3 Numbers 32395 and 22671 Pursuant to Rule 3006 of the Federal 4 Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure [ECF No. 38809] 5 6 A. LBHI's Opposition to Claimants' Motion to Withdraw 7 Claims 32395 And 22671 Pursuant to Rule 3006 of the 8 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure [ECF No. 38975] 9 10 B. Declaration of Jayant W. Tambe in Support of LBHI's 11 Opposition to Claimants' Motion to Withdraw Claims 32395 And 22671 Pursuant to Rule 3006 of the Federal 12 13 Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure [ECF No. 38976] 14 C. Declaration of Ines Pöschel in Support of LBHI's 15 16 Opposition to Claimants' Motion to Withdraw Claims 17 32395 And 22671 Pursuant to Rule 3006 of the Federal 18 Rules of Bankruptcy? Procedure [ECF No. 38977] 19 20 D. Declaration of Jonathan Nash QC in Support or LBHI's 21 Opposition to Claimants' Motion to Withdraw Claims 32395 And 22671 Pursuant to Rule 3006 of the Federal 22 23 Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure [ECF No, 38979] 24 25

Pg 3 of 48 Page 3 E. Declaration of Daniel J. Ehrmann in Support of LBHI's Opposition to Claimants' Motion to Withdraw Claims 32395 And 22671 Pursuant to Rule 3006 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure [ECF No. 38979] F. Reply in Support of the Motion of Dr. H.C. Tschira Beteiligungs GmbH & Co. KG and Klaus Tschira Stiftung GGmbH to Withdraw Claim Numbers 32395 and 22671 Pursuant to Rule 3006 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure [ECF No. 39052] G. Declaration of George A. Zimmerman in Support of the Motion of Dr. H.C. Tschira Beteiligungs GmbH & Co. KG and Klaus Tschira Stiftung GGmbH to withdraw Claim Numbers 32395 and 22671 Pursuant to Rule 3006 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure [ECF No. 39053] H. Declaration of Bernd Kammerlander in Support of the Motion of Dr. H.C. Tschira Beteiligungs GmbH & Co. KG and Klaus Tschira Stiftung GGmbH to withdraw Claim Numbers 32395 and 22671 Pursuant to Rule 3006 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure [ECF No. 39054]

24 | Hearing Re: Status

25 Transcribed by: Melissa Looney

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

	Page 4
1	APPEARANCES:
2	JONES DAY
3	Attorneys for Debtors
4	222 East 41st Street
5	New York, NY 10017
6	
7	BY: JAYANT W. TAMBE, ESQ.
8	MATTHEW S. CHOW, ESQ.
9	LOCKE R. MCMURRAY, ESQ.
10	
11	
12	SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM, LLP
13	Attorneys for the KTS
14	Four Times Square
15	New York, NY 10036
16	
17	BY: GEORGE A. ZIMMERMAN, ESQ.
18	SUSAN A. ARBEIT, ESQ.
19	JEFFREY GEIER, ESQ.
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

Page 5 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 THE COURT: Let's proceed. It's your motion? Mr. 3 Zimmerman, does the water bottle indicate you plan to talk 4 for a very long time? 5 MR. ZIMMERMAN: I dry out quickly, but with that 6 hint, I'll talk fast. 7 Good morning, Your Honor. THE COURT: Good morning. 8 9 MR. ZIMMERMAN: It's George Zimmerman representing 10 Thank you for hearing these on short notice. 11 This is KTS' motion to withdraw its proof of 12 It would be with prejudice against ability to ever bring any claim under the guarantee against LBHI in this or 13 any other court and without prejudice to continue its 14 15 litigation unfettered in Switzerland against LBF. 16 THE COURT: Can I ask a very basic threshold 17 question? 18 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yes. THE COURT: This is a question really for both 19 20 sides. Assuming for the sake of discussion that the only 21 thing that the order said was, quote, ordered that proofs of 22 claim numbers 32395 and 22671 are withdrawn with prejudice 23 period full stop. And none of your without prejudice were 24 included and none of the particulars requested by LBHI were included. And it simply said withdrawn with prejudice, how 25

would you be adversely affected if at all?

MR. ZIMMERMAN: I believe that the only potential issue would be if LBF or LBHI were to try to argue in the Swiss proceedings that that was somehow with prejudice that caused the dismissal as a matter of law without litigation of the Swiss proceedings or the opposition to the settlement agreement. That would be the only conceivable way.

How would Swiss Court -- in the U.S. typically -and I'm not familiar with Swiss law, U.S. typically the
collateral estoppel effect of your order, typically the
other court would look to how this Court would interpret
that. What the Swiss rules are, I don't know. So I'm not
sure at all subject to what I said that it would -- that it
would prejudice us.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: So with that, let me just briefly tell you where we are. As you know, LBHI was the guarantor of the underlying ISDA agreements between KTS -- the KTS enteritis and LBF. The exclusive jurisdiction for KTS to assert its claim in LBF is in the Swiss proceedings, which they did and there were full evidentiary submissions by KTS and LBF is shortly to follow. This was strictly a claim on the guarantee.

You know the relief we want.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: You know LBHI opposes it, you know the relief they want. They want you to make findings based on evidence, in quotes, that was submitted after KTS moved to withdraw -- affidavits that were never subjected to discovery, deposition, cross-examination or full briefing.

And they want to use those findings for the purposes I just talked about, to bar -- to argue in Switzerland that these findings would somehow preclude KTS from pursuing its claims against LBF and pursuing its objection to that settlement agreement.

There is no case that they cite -- no case that we've seen where a federal judge enters findings based on evidence that was never litigated beforehand. When we were here at the stay proceeding, we specifically had this dialogue where our theory of the stay was the threshold issue first, in the Swiss case is English law and the parties disputed English law governed the ISDA agreement.

What we proposed and what you counter proposed in more direct language was that all of that may be true, but the Section 562 issue is present uniquely in this Court.

It's a concept of U.S. Bankruptcy law. It will never be litigated in the Swiss proceeding. And even if KTS prevail -- if KTS loses in Switzerland, it's over. If KTS -- even if it prevails under English law, you still have to decide two things.

Whether the theory of KTS advocated under English law is consistent or inconsistent with 562. And if the latter, if it's inconsistent and you conclude that there was a commercially reasonable determinant of value as of September 15, that's the date LBHI advocates. Then you would presumably preclude that -- you would make whatever conclusions you do.

And the dialogue -- because this is important as to the scope of what we were here for -- in the transcript, and we attached the full transcript to our papers. We didn't want to excerpt anything.

THE COURT: I read it. Thank you.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: So feel free to highlight what you want to highlight.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Thank you, Judge. At pages 30 and 31 of the transcript you said, I view what's going on in Switzerland is not directly relevant to the claim resolution process in this Court, although you've pointed out -- that was referring to me -- that if the Tschira entities are unsuccessful in the case against LBF in Switzerland, claims here go away. If you are successful, the 562 issue can effectively be revisited then with reference to the guarantee claim, which is what I just said.

It's also possible we can flip that on its head

and I can preemptively deal with the guarantee issue under 562, determine you're either right or wrong with respect to the existence of commercially reasonable determinants of value as of October 16th of September 15th as argued by the Debtor. And you can either win or lose here.

And then you said this, if you lose here, that doesn't preclude your ability to argue against LBF in the Swiss proceeding, that my decision here was predicated on applicable bankruptcy law that isn't extend for their purposes.

THE COURT: I think I said that rather well.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: And since it's consistent with opposition, I agree.

And the other thing you were concerned about, the reason you wanted to speed it up was because the fact that the claim here had, quote, a significant impact on reserves in this case, because LBHI had to set aside a reserve for this case. That's gone. The reserve is gone. We're going to drop our claim. We're never suing LBH under the agreement.

so we modeled our order precisely along the lines as what you just meant in that quote. They want to go further. They want to say, no you should use this -- take the occasion to make findings on unvetted evidence that would destroy -- that they would argue would destroy the

ability in Switzerland. There is no precedent for that.

There's no case to that. And the test is Rule 3006, which is also -- it's the analog to Federal Rule 41(a) and they're kind of construed the same.

The test is, there's a policy towards granting withdrawals to resolve conflicts. But they can be conditioned if the Court concludes that the withdrawal of the claim would somehow prejudice the Defendant.

The only prejudice they have, they argue is that well, there's the subjection by KTS to that settlement agreement. KTS is objecting in Switzerland, which is holding up a potential distribution, which is true. There is an objection. They have the right to do that.

But if you were to make a finding that allows the elimination of that objection by ruining their standing as creditor, well then we can speed up the distribution.

There's two problems with that. That's not -assuming that's legal prejudice -- which it's not -- that's
not caused by the withdrawal of the claim. Had we never
brought the claim, obviously KTS could have objected to the
settlement agreement. So withdrawing the claim just puts
the parties back where they were before the claim was
brought and that's what legal prejudice means.

And we cited -- the cases that have actually looked at this issue where a party wants to withdraw a claim

and the defendant wants to try to condition that on preventing the withdrawing party from suing other people in the same claim. All of the cases -- all of the cases that have looked at that -- uniformly hold that the withdrawal will be with prejudice as against that defendant, you can never sue that defendant affirmatively again, but without prejudice to your ability to sue third parties.

And even if it means -- and in all those cases, or most of the cases -- the defendants argued, well if you permit the claimant to sure third parties that are related to the defendant and he wins, those defendants then have an indemnification contribution claim back against the debtor. Now the Courts recognize that and say it doesn't matter, because had they never brought the claim they could have sued third parties and those third parties would have had whatever rights they have. So there's no cause and effect and every case that has looked at this has concluded that one way. There is no case where a judge has made findings based on completely unvetted evidence. They're asking you to go into uncharged territory without absolutely no reason to do that.

One other point, if I may. And it's -- it is not germane but there is a constant theme that the tactics in quote, that KTS is using is somehow were improper. Let me address that in two ways.

Think about this. The only harm as I just talked about is that settlement agreement. KTS filed its objection in 2009. There was no settlement agreement. The settlement agreement was in 2013.

THE COURT: You said filed its objection. Do you mean filed its claim?

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Sorry. Strike -- thank you, Judge. Fled its proof of claims here in 2009. Thank you. Had LBHI moved to overrule those claims earlier, either we would have litigated that, we would have withdrawn it, there was no issue about the settlement agreement. There was no settlement agreement. LBHI chose not to -- to waive. That's -- we don't impugn their motives. Unlike them, every time KTS makes a strategic decision, it's wrong, it's evil, it's sinister. We're not saying that. A debtor has a million things they have to prioritize. We get it.

They decided for whatever legitimate reason, even if it's legitimate, tactically to wait four years and that's their right. You have a right to make tactical decisions. But when you make a tactical decision, you've got to live with both the benefits and the burdens. During that four year interim period, the facts on the ground changed having nothing to do -- totally not within the control of KTS.

There was a settlement reached.

Now, having waited all this time to try to move --

to overrule the claim, they are latching onto something that they could have totally avoided had they moved earlier. So there's no way KTS is responsible even if that was legally cognizable prejudice, which the cases say it's not.

Final point before I sit down.

THE COURT: Before you make a final point.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Let's talk a little bit more about the point you just articulated, which is the notion of your client -- and I'm not sure if it's KTS or Tschira or how to properly name them, but we'll use them interchangeably. The notion is that your client is a shameless opportunist and is using the proceedings in Switzerland as a means to unfairly extract value that you are not entitled to as a matter of law because any reasonable person looking either at English law or at Section 562 would conclude that you are due zero dollars and in fact may owe dollars to the estate.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: And you are exercising these rights at a particularly critical time to the life of both the estates in Switzerland and here by threatening as the last person standing a settlement that is demonstrably beneficial to all parties in interest. And so without saying anything uncharitable, you appear to be at a minimum, opportunistic and at a maximum, something I won't say. But you know what

I'm thinking. You can read my mind and it's the word that starts with a T.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Let me respond to that. There is

-- first of all, let's look at the timing. LBF didn't

publish its list of creditors that admitted -- let's call

them KTS if that's okay with you -- until I believe March of

2013. That's when KTS objected -- started its claim in

Switzerland saying, I should be a creditor. So before that,

there was no issue. We know the timing of the settlement

agreement.

If the argument is that KTS and this timing was totally in control of LBF when it published its list of creditors and LBF and LBHI when to settle. If the claim is that somehow exercising what they perceive to be legitimate rights is increasing their leverage first as against LBHI, that's gone. We're withdrawing the claim, there's no negotiation, they won. So that can't possibly be right.

To the extent -- I'm hoping you were paraphrasing the Lehman's argument that a reasonable person could do nothing but conclude that as a matter of English law under the ISDA Or 562 or whatever law you want, that there's no merit to the position, presumably if Swiss courts are reasonable and they will demolish KTS and call them whatever they want and issue whatever appropriate sanction is applicable.

But on that point, let me now get to the point -the last point I wanted to make before I sit down because I
think it goes at least tangentially to your point. One of
the things they argued is that obviously there was a
commercially reasonable determinative value as of September
15th, because there are these quotes, the three quotes,
Mediobanca, Golden Sachs, Lehman Brothers. I'm sorry, JP
Morgan. That somehow KTS tried to hide and that shows an
inconsistency in positions that KTS is trying to use two
courts against each other.

Let me just address that briefly, because it goes to the -- it's not legally relevant, it goes to the atmospherics, but it's important. We have those affidavits are attached to an exhibit that Lehman put in. I'm sorry; the valuations are attached to an affidavit Lehman put in.

Not only were those valuations not hidden, the way they were filed by KTS in the Swiss proceeding. And they were filed to show -- and again, just to refresh your recollection,

KTS' position is that under English law, the valuation date is the date when you find out -- you're allowed to try to enter into an exact replacement transaction, which in our case was collateralized with 59 million shares. It wasn't until October 16th they found out they were not going to get the collateral back and KTS' position is that under English law, that's the valuation date. And obviously LBHI

Page 16 1 disagrees both under English law and I think more 2 importantly for your purposes under Section 562. And they 3 say, well you obviously got these valuations, so it's commercially reasonably determinant as of September 15th. 4 5 There are two problems with that. May I just hand 6 up those exhibits just to walk you through from one --7 THE COURT: You can hand up whatever you like. MR. ZIMMERMAN: Thank you. 8 9 (Pause) 10 THE COURT: I've seen these before. MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yes. They are Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 11 12 to -- I hope I'm pronouncing these right, the Poschel 13 affidavit -- P-O-S-C-H-E-L submitted by LBHI. 14 THE COURT: Right. 15 MR. ZIMMERMAN: The Mediobanca valuation which is 16 the first one is for a collateralized transaction, which is 17 the point KTS made in Switzerland because they say we couldn't get -- we wouldn't be able to do a collateralized 18 transaction until October 16th. But forget that. Here's 19 20 what I want to get to. If you look at page 1, they summarize the nature 21 22 of the transaction. It has four tranches, two variable 23 forward sale, variable forward purchase. And at the bottom 24 of that first page, they explain that in the variable forward sale transaction, KTS is long a European put option 25

and short a European call option. Okay. If you go to page 5 -- I'm sorry page 6. Sorry, Your Honor. Mediobanca describes the second part of it which is the variable forward purchase. In those two transactions, KTS is effectively short, but down an input option with rebate and long down in call in (ph) option on shares. That's the transaction.

If you look at the next exhibit, Exhibit 2, which is the Goldman Exhibit, it's the Goldman quote and on its face you can see when you compare it to the description of the transaction in Mediobanca. Goldman only values the variable forward sale. That's when KTS was long to put in short. They don't value the variable forward purchase. If they -- it's not a valuation. They weren't giving -- and if you want to make implications -- as of September 15th is because they couldn't come up with one.

And the third exhibit, which they claim is another quote, it's the JP Morgan exhibit. That's Exhibit 3. And again it's a cash collateralized transaction, but put that aside. It says, we are -- all three accounts have now been opened. We are ready to go with the total returns swap on Monday if you'd like. That's not this deal. That's a different kind of hedge. And again, because KTS was looking for the same transaction, if you want to make implications, it's because JP Morgan couldn't come up with a valuation

either.

Now, and we -- the recipient of all three of these was Bernd Kammerlander and he put in an affidavit on our behalf. So one more point, so this whole notion -- so all of this is perfectly consistent with KTS' positions in both, that's why they put them in Switzerland. They think it's helpful to their case. And as I just demonstrated, I think it's helpful to our case here.

One final point, even if you ignore it, even if these were legitimate quotes, if you look at -- and you made this point last time and you were correct that there's a presumptive -- there's a presumption that the markets act right and if there's publicly traded stock, you can get a value. And it would be our burden to overcome that and that's all fair.

There's an exception if there's a dysfunctional market and that's what we were going to try to prove one or the other, but here's the point. One of the only cases, if not the only case, to talk about 562 in any length is the American Home case, Third Circuit opinion. And the issue was -- both sides conceded it was a dysfunctional market. So the issue was is there any commercially reasonable determinant way to value a mortgage backed security portfolio without a functional market. And in that particular case, the Court found, yeah, you could do a

discounted cash flow, because it's a series of mortgages, there's a finite period of time, a known cash flow, so you can apply whatever discount. That's legit. But the Court recognized, both the lower court and the Third Circuit, quote, "Where the market is dysfunctional, it may be difficult or impossible to use a market price to assign value to an entire asset or asset pool in a single day... because the nature of the market at a given time would result in having to sell or liquidate the asset in a commercially unreasonable manner." Close quote.

And the Third Circuit in that same vein said it is again you're starting point is the market. Quote, "It is only -- and this is for purposes of 562. "It is only when the market is dysfunctional and the market price does not reflect an assets worth should one turn to other determinants of value." Close quote.

So the only or certainly the most convincing case law in 562, does not necessarily deem market price is controlling. That's the whole point about giving somebody the opportunity. And that's why 562 says, the presumption is the determination date and if you couldn't come up with a commercially reasonable determinant value, the first date thereafter. That's what this whole litigation was going to be about. That's why you wanted discovery. That's why you wanted expert testimony. Notwithstanding the steep hill

that you acknowledge we have.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

So to put in three valuations, two of which are dead wrong and actually show you couldn't value it, and to put in one that was a collateralized transaction which KTS could not do and then to have to suggest that that's conclusive of anything and that, quote, no reasonable person could ever argue that it's not these valuations. It's just not right. It's wrong. And there's no evidentiary record to call out to any other conclusion, whatever preconceptions LBHI may have. That's what the litigation was going to be about before u. That's what we were going to brief and have experts and the whole nine yards. But we decided -- KTS decided to focus on what it considers the underlying, obviously primary claim. And to free LBHI from any affirmative liability and to free up the reserve. I thank you for listening.

THE COURT: I've listened, but I'm not done listening.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Oh, I'm sorry. I apologize.

THE COURT: I have a couple of more questions for you.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: One of which relates to your last argument, which in effect goes to the very merits that you said I shouldn't be considering. So I find it somewhat

curious that you decided to close by arguing that there was something potentially reasonable to have been presented here had you not withdrawn your claim. And you're in effect using that as a reason why I should not condition withdrawal of your claim on preclusive relief in favor of Lehman. I assume that's the reason that you made that argument. MR. ZIMMERMAN: No. Just to be clear, as I said before I started that argument, while it's not relevant, the reason I made the argument was because they are suggesting as part of the atmospherics that those valuations were hidden --THE COURT: They're suggesting that you're a nefarious -- your client is nefarious and scheming and litigious to a fault. MR. ZIMMERMAN: But -- well I addressed that before. But specifically with respect, I'm talking about the -- that's one of the disparagements. The other one was THE COURT: Shall I come up with some other disparagements? MR. ZIMMERMAN: No, no. I just want to -- I just want to explain what I just said, which is what the lead in was. THE COURT: That's really what my question is, why were you making that argument?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Because the notion -- if they want to -- if they want to impact your decision based on an atmospheric argument, I wanted to clear the atmosphere, so that whatever decision you make is on a justified proven record. And the point of that was the notion that KTS hid the valuations when we refer to it in our papers, that those valuations somehow show again atmospherically that KTS is taking inconsistent positions before you and Switzerland and that KTS is somehow trying to play one court off the other.

That atmospheric, which should have no bearing on this is false. And what I tried to explain by going through it is not to litigate this. I'm not an expert, obviously that's not -- unlike -- that's not evidence that's been subjected to cross-examination. And it's not been vetted, but it does go to this atmospheric point that they keep throwing at you in the absence of any law that supports their position. That's why I made that -- that's why I refer to the valuations.

THE COURT: Well there's more to the atmospherics which you haven't dispelled and I want to give you an opportunity to dispel it now. And that is apart from the merits of any argument that might be made under Section 562 or applicable English law with regard to the proper interpretation of the underlying ISDA agreement that your client is involved in activities in Switzerland and here

that are designed to put maximum commercial and economic pressure on a settlement that is demonstrably beneficial to LBHI and frankly, also to all creditors of LBF, a settlement that has been approved here and approved there. And so part of the atmosphere is that your client is taking a questionable legal position for purposes of extracting value now at a time when there is maximum leverage as against that settlement. That atmosphere is still in the room. And you've said nothing to dispel it.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: The only -- here's all I can say.

And the Harrowlinda (ph) affidavit makes reference to this

too.

THE COURT: That affidavit, if I'm remembering correctly said, well we're the only really unhedged creditor, whatever that means and I don't know what that means.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: And I don't know what your real motivation is and I assume it's purely economic, but it's also designed to delay the resolution of a very significant settlement to the detriment -- economic detriment of many other creditors, which makes you appear to be standing in front of a tank and stopping it.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Here's what I know.

THE COURT: I'm making you seem heroic with that

image, by the way.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Oh, thank you. But so long as the train doesn't run me over, I don't mind being a hero.

Let me tell you what I know and then you're going to have to draw whatever inference you want, because the record is what it is. I have no doubt -- you approved it -- the settlement is being in the best interest of LBHI. I'm not touching that. It's been approved by the Court in Switzerland.

THE COURT: By the way, let me stop for a second.

Was there some reason why you did not object to the settlement here?

MR. ZIMMERMAN: I think -- well I believe the procedure set up for objecting to the settlement was as follows. Settlement gets published, whatever. Creditors committee I think had to approve it. You then publish it and then they set up the settlement -- sorry the objection vehicle that you can appeal to the financial institution, FINRA I think it's called in Switzerland.

THE COURT: You may be misunderstanding the question. I don't question what you're doing in Switzerland in terms of the procedure.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Oh.

THE COURT: I'm questioning why, if you know, your client didn't step up to oppose approval of the settlement

Page 25 1 here? 2 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Oh, I'm sorry. Sure. I can -- I 3 mean, I can reason why, which is as follows. THE COURT: But do you know? 4 5 MR. ZIMMERMAN: No. I never discussed it, but I 6 think my reasoning is compelling so let me just give it and 7 I --8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Their position, by the way, is not 10 that the settlement -- that LBF gave up to much value to 11 LBHI full stop. Maybe that's right, maybe that's not. 12 Naturally, you're not going to come to a bankruptcy court --13 number one, they're a creditor, fundamentally the primary 14 claim as we've always said is against LBF. That's where 15 they think they're going to prevail. That's where they 16 think there's a significant pay out for creditors. And 17 that's where they're hurt most if LBF gives up too much 18 value. They're not -- the -- to come to you, Judge and 19 20 say we object to the settlement not because it gives -- it's 21 not in LBHI's best interest, it is. In fact, I think their position is too good. It's hurting LBF in their Swiss 22 proceeding. What does that have -- I don't -- I would --23 24 not that I was involved, but it wouldn't dawn on me to come

to this Court to object either. I would go to Switzerland

because that's the entity that the client believes is giving up too much value.

THE COURT: Well, I don't mean to break in, but at the time of approval of the settlement, I approved it both in respect of the LBHI case and the Chapter 15 case for LBF. And LBF's foreign representative was here as an advocate for that settlement. You had a perfect opportunity or at least your client did to stand up and be counted then, but didn't.

And so it leads to the conclusion, not necessarily the only conclusion, that part of what is going on here is a gaming of that settlement there at a time when you have increased potential leverage unrelated to the merits of your claims, but rather related to the holdup value associated with objecting. And that's the negative atmosphere and that's what you have not dispelled.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: I've told you everything I know.
THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: I haven't discussed this. I'm not going to speculate to you, Judge. It's not fair to either of us. I've told you everything I know. The rationale I assumed happened. I was not involved. But I continue to believe that the procedure was to object to try to get an appealable order from FINRA, that's what they're doing. And if it turns out under Swiss law, they're as frivolous as LBHI says, presumably there's a heavy price to pay. But I

can't give you any more information that I just don't know.

THE COURT: Do you know whether or not there is a bonding requirement associated with taking an appeal from an appealable FINRA order?

MR. ZIMMERMAN: I believe -- what I said last time and this was fresh on my mind last time. The answer I believe is yes and there was a dispute as to the amount. I don't know what -- and that issue on the amount or that dispute when we were here last time had been or was about to be joined and they were expecting a decision. So I think the answer is yes. I think there is a dispute as to the amount, but if I say anymore, I'm going to be speaking -- that's all I know.

THE COURT: Okay. And this is now my final question and I'm picking up something that you do on occasion, which is say that you're about to make a final point and then there are three or four that follow.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yeah. Fair enough.

THE COURT: But my final question is this and it's in the category of if you know. So if the answer is you don't know, it becomes a very short answer. Do you know if there are any procedures available in the Swiss proceeding to materially expedite the resolution of that proceeding as it relates to the merits of your objection?

MR. ZIMMERMAN: I do not know.

Page 28 1 THE COURT: That's fine. Thank you. 2 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Thank you, Judge. MR. TAMBE: Your Honor, if I may just confer on 3 4 the final question you asked to see if I have an answer for 5 you -- your question. (Pause) 7 MR. TAMBE: Good morning, Your Honor. Jay Tambe on behalf of the Debtor. Let me start by just answering the 8 9 questions Your Honor posed to Mr. Zimmerman at the end 10 there. There is a bonding requirement. We understand that 11 the bond has been set at a relatively low amount of Swiss 12 francs, 10,000. It could be raised up to 50,000 Swiss franc,, but that's my understanding. And I don't know that 13 14 first hand. That's based on information I just received. 15 Two, we don't believe that there is any procedure 16 for materially expediting the objection that has been filed 17 by the KT entities in Switzerland, so it's going to take a 18 while. THE COURT: What's the consequence, if you know, 19 20 the financial consequence of a party like KTS pursuing an 21 appeal unsuccessfully that results in demonstrable material losses to LBHI and to LBF, is there recourse? 22 23 MR. TAMBE: I don't know the answer to that, Your 24 Honor. Whether there's any kind of a cost or a sanction 25 associated with that type of a tactic by someone like KTS in

the Swiss proceedings. I don't know the answer to that. I don't know if we have a remedy for the delay and the prejudice that would be caused.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm sure someone at some point will consider that and someone at some point will consider whether KTS and the Tschira entities are embarking on a high risk strategy, but that's not for me to decide today.

MR. TAMBE: So let me start with where I think there is at least some agreement. There's some agreement that at this juncture of the case, the claims cannot be withdrawn except for an order by this Court. And this Court has discretion in fashioning the terms and conditions upon which such a withdraw would be conditioned or concluding in the alternative that the claim should not be permitted to be withdrawn so that we in fact do go to a hearing, which was to be done on an expedited basis in any event.

Clearly, you have two very differing views of what an appropriate order should look like. They have a bare bones order that says, claims are dismissed prejudice except where they're not. And just taking that order at face value, we clearly have objections with a notion that there is a dismissal with prejudice except where it's not. And the two exceptions are fairly significant.

THE COURT: Mr. Tambe let me ask you the very same question that I started with when Mr. Zimmerman was making

his presentation, which is in what way, if at all, would LBHI be prejudiced if I were to enter a bare bones order that was even more bare bones than the order proposed by KTS and simply said, ordered that proofs of claim numbers 32395 and 22671 are withdrawn with prejudice period and the rest of the proposed order doesn't appear, except in the imagination of KTS?

MR. TAMBE: Your Honor, the answer to that question would be if all I was concerned with -- if all that LBHI was concerned with was purely U.S. proceedings where the only folks who would ever look at that order or have to pass on what that order means were juris who were intimately familiar with U.S. procedure and what it is, I may not press my point as hard as I am pressing it.

The reason we think more needs to be said is because a withdrawal with prejudice means something special under U.S. jurisprudence, which is not captured just by those words and certainly to a judge who is sitting half a world away who sees for example a transcript where this Court focused on 562 and the 562 aspects, that judge may well conclude following Mr. Zimmerman's lead, that all that was before this Court and all that could have been determined or was determined were 562 issues. No other claims or issues were ever presented to this Court. And that I think would fundamentally mischaracterize and

misstate the nature of both what the claims were, what claims were filed and what it means to withdraw those claims with prejudice.

A withdrawal of claims with prejudice is the functional equivalent of a Rule 41 dismissal with prejudice. And the cases are clear and I think there's no disagreement that you look to the Rule 41 cases for guidance on how Rule 3006 ought to be construed. And under Rule 41, if you have a dismissal with prejudice, it's not taking the parties back to the status exactly. It's actually saying these claims have been resolved on the merits against the Plaintiff. It's res judicata as to all claims that were filed or that could have been filed.

We don't even need to talk about what claims could have been filed. Let's just focus on what claims were filed. I don't think there's any dispute here that the claim that was filed was premised on a contract law question, an interpretation of contract law. What do these master agreements mean? What does it mean to value those agreements as of a particular date?

You don't need to consider our declarations or the valuations or any of that. By withdrawing their claims with prejudice, what they are saying in a U.S. Court is the merits of those claims have been decided and they've been decided against us. That's what we're seeking in the

findings of fact and conclusions of law. What we're seeking is an explication by this Court that when there is a withdrawal with prejudice, here is what it means. It means that the claims that you were pursuing in this Court have been decided against you. Not because they were actually litigated, but because that is the legal equivalent, that is the legal import of what it means to withdraw with prejudice. That's why we have the set of findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Now, whether that has any collateral estoppel effect in Switzerland, we are not asking you to speak to at all. We think it's appropriate for a Swiss court to decide whether or not that has any collateral estoppel effect.

Certainly if the Court wants to go further and believes as an exercise of its jurisdiction there are additional clarifications and conditions that the Court believes are necessary, we certainly would not object to that. But at a minimum, I think we need some clarity as to what it means to withdraw claims with prejudice. That's what's behind the findings of fact and conclusions of law.

We're not asking you to make evidentiary findings based on the affidavits we've submitted. What we're asking you to do is find as a legal matter, that is the conclusion, that is the effect of the step they have taken, which is the withdrawal with prejudice.

Now, why have we provided you with the declarations? We've provided you with the declarations to make the point that I think Your Honor picked on. We don't think there was any reasonable basis from back in 2009 for these claims ever to have been filed.

There's a point that's made in the reply submission that I wanted to focus on. And it is on paragraph 25 of the reply papers served by KT. And they declare indeed the so called valuations demonstrate that it was not possible to obtain a quote for a replacement transaction as of September 15, 2008.

anything, it was a quote, for a replacement transaction as of September 15th, 2008. Their quarrel with that quote is simply that they could not actually enter into that transaction, but there is no dispute that on its face, what that was a quotation from a bank to enter into a replacement transaction as of September 15th, 2008. There's no two things about it. They may call it something else, but on its face, that's what it is.

And certainly under both 562 and English law, the ISDA master agreement and what the ISDA master agreement requires, that values the transaction as of the early termination date. And they've had that piece of paper in their possession since September 19th.

This maybe should simply have never been filed and they only thought about withdrawing it when their first tactic failed, which is have this Court basically say, I'm not going to touch the issue until the Swiss courts are done with it. That was our first response when we put in our objection. Their first response was, this Court needn't get involved in it. All these issues are being resolved in Switzerland.

It's only when that tactic failed and when this

Court said, no we're going to have an evidentiary hearing,

we're going to have discovery and we're going to get to the

bottom of this issue and when we said, okay we want a trial

on these issues, we want all the issues tried.

I don't think there was anything said at the June 13th hearing that said that there would be a truncated trial of only some issues and not other issues. It's entirely possible that your court -- that the Court could have limited its ruling to just 562 issues. But in terms of the issues that were going to be developed by the parties, they certainly include an English law as to the contract, the interpretation of English law and the effect of English law and the validity of these quotations and what effect that had on the agreement and 562.

THE COURT: I expect by the way, Mr. Tambe, not that it matters, that the trial or hearing, however long it

might take, of the issues raised would include applicable
English law as well as 562 largely because during his
argument on the stay, Mr. Zimmerman focused on applicable
English law as being appropriate law for me to consider and
in effect the equivalent of considering state law under a
state law governed ISDA. This is English law under an
English law governed ISDA. And in the sense that Section
562 may or may not be considered in a vacuum -- and that
legal question hasn't been answered -- I would expect that
English law questions would be presented. But this is an
entirely theoretical construct. We don't actually need to
get into any of this now. Although I know Mr. Zimmerman did
in his argument.

This argument in connection with a motion to withdraw claim has become in effect, a derivative for the litigation that might have been pursued if the claim hadn't been withdrawn.

MR. TAMBE: So I'm not going to belabor the point,
Your Honor. Suffice to say that the reason we have in our
proposed order those findings of fact and conclusions of
law, are not to suggest that this Court has considered or
tried those issues, but that's the legal effect if they
withdraw with prejudice of the claims they presented.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. TAMBE: There are two other aspects to the

order that we seek as terms and conditions for the withdraw with prejudice. This has certainly been I think an expensive undertaking for the estate. It wasn't like they played out this tactic when we first filed the objection in March of this year, nor when we put in the more detailed supplemental objection laying out precisely the reasons why we believe this was an improper claim and the claim should be expunged. They stuck around and they fought it and they argued that in fact it should remain alive, but stayed.

After we left this Court on June 13th we engaged in meet and confers about the schedule. And by any stretch, it was a schedule that was going to be very tight and very accelerated. That required us to go ahead and hire experts to prepare the legal submissions to prepare a single discovery request which we served on them, which they found to be overly burdensome. But those costs were incurred by the estate. And as part of the order we would seek reimbursement of those costs and expensive, both attorneys fees as well as expert fees.

We'd also seek discovery. The one discovery request we have served on KTS is give us all of the valuation information you have. We see bits and pieces of it. We see some that you submit here. We see some that you've submitted in Switzerland. What else do you have? How many other valuations did you do between September and

October of 2008 or thereafter? The valuation that they ultimately hang their hat on is a December 1, 2008 valuation. So get us all the valuation information that you have, that your advisors have. They've been through several advisors, give us that basic information. It's a single documents request. I think it's again fair as a condition given the atmospherics and given everything else that's going on here. That while they are subject to the Court's jurisdiction, I think it's within the Court's power to say they should comply with that minimal discovery request.

THE COURT: Can I break in and ask you a question
I should have raised with Mr. Zimmerman but didn't and I'm
going to ask him the same question during his further
commentary on this point. And you said, quote, "while KTS
is still subject to this Court's jurisdiction", close quote.

Assuming that I enter an order in one form or another authorizing the withdrawal of claim numbers 32395 and 22671 absent some further agreement, is it your position that KTS and Tschira entities are no longer subject to the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction?

MR. TAMBE: I don't definitely know the answer to that, but that's certainly a risk we fear, that once they have obtained an order giving them withdraw with prejudice, they will take the position that they are no longer subject to this Court's jurisdiction.

THE COURT: And assuming that is the case, in what forum, if any would LBHI pursue affirmatively relief against these entities?

MR. TAMBE: There's at least one conceivable avenue for affirmative relief and it hasn't really been the subject of any of the briefing.

The week before the LBHI Bankruptcy filing, the KT entities demanded and received 100 million Euros in additional collateral. Not tied to the valuation of the trades, but just as a additional security that they demanded from the Lehman entities.

Some time ago in light of potential statutes of limitation, the parties had entered into a tolling agreement. I believe last week we terminated that tolling agreement and one of the avenues that we are considering is whether we will pursue either LBHI or LBHI or LBSF or some combination would pursue an action against the Klaus Tschira entities for return of that 100 million in collateral and as potentially a preference action.

So that is one specific potential avenue of relief that I can think about that we might consider pursuing.

THE COURT: And is that an action that would be brought in this Court?

MR. TAMBE: We would certainly intend to bring it in this Court, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And if an action were brought in another court, I presume there are other courts of competent jurisdiction in Europe where this family of companies does business and will be subject to jurisdiction and they might even be subject to jurisdiction here. I'm not commenting.

MR. TAMBE: And I don't want to rule out one way or the other. I think they certainly would be subject to jurisdiction here given that they've come here and brought their claims here. They've also consented to jurisdiction in the Courts of England and Wales pursuant to the ISDA master agreement. A forearm they seem to have seriously avoided for the determination of any of their so called rights under the ISDA master agreement.

THE COURT: But to be clear you are not asking as a condition of the order that there be an agreement on the part of the withdrawing claim holders to ongoing jurisdiction to the Bankruptcy Court with respect to any affirmative claims that your client may have?

MR. TAMBE: We have not sought that as part of our proposed order, but should the Court believe that it's a proper term and condition to be included, we would certainly welcome it.

THE COURT: Okay. It's as to that question that I'd like Mr. Zimmerman to comment later.

(Pause)

MR. TAMBE: The point we've made a couple of times and this is I think my last observation that in a sense, we have not cited any case to Your Honor that provides for the relief that we are seeking. And my response to that is while what we are seeking may be unprecedented, it is not unprincipled. This wouldn't be the first time in the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy that this Court has had to rule on issues that have not previously been ruled on by other courts.

But the principals that we're relying on, Your
Honor, are rock solid principles. They go to Rule 41, what
does it mean to dismiss with prejudice? What does it mean
for us to be subject to this continuing threat to the
settlement that this Court has already approved? And how
can we be properly protected in this cross border scenario.
Where it may be perfectly understood what res judicata and
withdraw with prejudice means in the U.S. but it could be
subject to misinterpretation or misapprehension on the other
side of the pond. And we simply want an order that spells
out exactly what it is that a withdraw with prejudice gives
us.

I'm happy to answer any other question the Court may have.

THE COURT: I don't have any others right now.

MR. TAMBE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Zimmerman, do you want to speak to the jurisdictional question? And you can also respond to other matters that you think appropriate to comment on.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Thank you. Last week when LBHI terminated that tolling agreement we had assumed that they would be filing with a preference for whatever theory they had on that \$100 million amount that Mr. Tambe mentioned and without having discussed it with the client, I had assumed that that would be heard in this Court. So I think -- I hope that answers the question.

With respect to -- the only other point I'll make with respect to the acknowledgement that there's no precedent on this, but that you've had occasion in the past in the Lehman Bankruptcy Case to rule on issues of first impression, that's absolutely true. But there is a -- there is plenty of case law, unlike the cases you had, there is plenty of case law in Rule 41 and 3006, plenty of times when defendants have tried to object to withdraws of claims by conditioning them on forfeiture of rights against third parties and they all come out our way. So subject to any other questions you have, that's the only thing I need to say to Mr. Tambe.

THE COURT: Just a further question on retained jurisdiction and that is do you have a position one way or

1 the other as to the impact on this Court's jurisdiction over 2 your client of your withdraw of proofs of claims with 3 prejudice -- in other words, to what extent, absent some further litigation, does LBHI have a right to seek 4 5 affirmative relief with respect to the very same 6 transactions that were the subject of your proofs of claim 7 after the withdrawal of those proofs of claim? MR. ZIMMERMAN: As I stand here I don't, but I can 8 9 let you know KTS' position in 24 hours. I don't know what 10 their contacts are with the U.S. separate from the 11 bankruptcy and whether it be an agreement -- whatever the 12 answer -- the legal answer to the question is, whether 13 there'd be a willingness to submit to the continuing jurisdiction of this Court even with the claim withdrawn, I 14 15 can advise you when I get instructions in 24 hours. 16 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 17 Is there anything more on this? 18 MR. TAMBE: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: This is a very interesting and as the 19 20 parties have acknowledged, unprecedented attempt to withdraw 21 a very significant claim against LBHI. And it is very unusual in my experience for the voluntary withdrawal of a 22 \$600 million claim to result in such robust and strenuous 23 24 opposition on the part of the Debtor that notionally is 25 benefitted by the withdrawal of that claim.

In effect, we are arguing here, both in the papers and in oral argument about matters that are not presently pending before the Court. If you look at this in the most simple terms, KTS known as the Tschira entities along with its affiliate KG are seeking to withdraw claims rather than litigate those claims to conclusion here.

The fact that they have chosen to fold their tents indicates a form of foreign selection on their part. I conclude that they have determined that they are better off arguing issues relating to the replacement of the transactions that are the subject of these claims in Switzerland in the context of objecting to the LBF settlement there, rather than litigating those very same issues here. And frankly, that's their right.

They voluntarily submitted to this Court's jurisdiction with respect to the guarantee claims when they filed those claims in 2009. And after seeing the atmosphere in this courtroom, particularly comments that I made in reference to section 562, I believe they decided they were better off simply moving on.

Regardless of their motivations, they have the right, subject to appropriate conditions to withdraw proofs of claims 32395 and 22671 after issue has been joined.

LBHI seeks to elaborately condition the withdrawal of those claims upon a set of findings of fact and

conclusions of law that potentially could have preclusive impact upon the rights of the Tschira entities in the Swiss proceedings. In effect, LBHI seeks to convert a withdrawal of a claim into the functional equivalent of a detailed adjudication on the merits.

I am not prepared to do that and will not do that.

But what I will do is enter a form of order substantially along the lines proposed by the Tschira entities with these amendments.

As I foreshadowed in my questioning, the order will end with the third decretal paragraph which states, ordered that proofs of claim numbers 32395 and 22671 are withdraw with prejudice and the sentence will stop there. There will be a period inserted after the words with prejudice. And the exceptions will all be deleted.

There will be a further decretal paragraph and it is further ordered that the Tschira entities shall continue to be subject to this Court's jurisdiction with respect to any affirmative claims of the Debtors or words to that effect.

I believe that it is appropriate for the Swiss court to have complete discretion in determining the manner in which this order impacts claims and offenses in the Swiss proceeding. The Tschira entities will be free to argue as to the legal consequences of having withdrawn their claims

here with prejudice. And LBHI and LBF similarly will be free to argue as to the appropriate legal consequences associated with the withdrawal of these proofs of claim.

Finally, I will make an observation that does not fit neatly within this ruling with respect to the withdrawal of these two proofs of claim. I am frankly concerned that the Tschira entities are engaged in legally permissible activity that is also highly undesirable from the perspective of both LBF and LBHI. And more importantly, from the perspective of parties in interest that have supported and are benefitted by the settlement between LBHI and LBF that was approved by this Court and the Swiss court.

I encourage the parties to explore economic solutions to this dispute that makes sense relative to the delay and expense associated with the Swiss litigation. It would be highly desirable for the parties to reach an accommodation with each other before September 30.

To the extent that this Court can be helpful in supervising settlement discussions between the parties, I make myself available, particularly since the disputes in question are to be adjudicated in the Swiss court and not here.

I ask Mr. Zimmerman to report to my chambers before the close of business tomorrow as to whether his client will accept the condition that I have imposed on the

	Page 46				
1	withdrawal of these claims, namely that the Tschira agree to				
2	be subject to the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction with				
3	respect to any affirmative claims of LBHI.				
4	That's the ruling of the Court. Thank you very				
5	much.				
6	MR. TAMBE: Thank you, Your Honor.				
7					
8					
9					
10					
11					
12					
13					
14					
15					
16					
17					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
23					
24					
25					

	Pg 47 of 48			7
			Page 47	
1	INDEX			
2				
3	RULING			
4		PAGE	LINE	
5	Motion of Withdraw Claim	42	18	
6	Numbers 32395 and 22671 Pursuant			
7	to Rule 3006 of the Federal Rules of			
8	Bankruptcy Procedure [ECF No. 38809]			
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
	1			- 1

Page 48 1 CERTIFICATION 2 3 I, Melissa Looney, certify that the foregoing transcript is 4 a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Melissa Digitally signed by Melissa Looney 5 DN: cn=Melissa Looney, o, ou, email=digital1@veritext.com, c=US Looney Date: 2013.08.01 15:29:27 -04'00' 6 7 MELISSA LOONEY AAERT Certified Electronic Transcriber CET**D - 607 8 9 10 11 Veritext 12 200 Old Country Road 13 Suite 580 14 Mineola, NY 11501 15 16 Date: July 30, 2013 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25